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Abstract
We show that decoy-state quantum key distribution is unconditionally secure even there are
errors in the intensity control provided that the upper-bound of intensity of all pulses are known.
In our protocol, we simply let Alice each time first produce a father pulse and then determine to
produce intensity µ or µ′ by attenuation. In calculating the fraction of single-photon counts, Alice
only need assume that she had used intensities of µ˜, µ˜′ exactly even though there are fluctuations
in the actual intensity control.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
Recently, some methods[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] have been proposed for secure quantum
key distribution (QKD)[9, 10, 11] with coherent states[12, 13, 14]. One of these methods is
the so called decoy-state method[1, 2, 3, 4, 5] where Alice randomly changes the intensity
of her pulses among a few values and then she can verify the fraction of tagged bits (those
counts at Bob’s side due to multi-photon pulses from Alice) or un-tagged bits (single-photon
counts) in the raw key. A secure final key can be distilled by using the separate theoretical
results[15] if one knows the upper bound of the fraction of tagged bits or equivalently, the
lower bound of the fraction of un-tagged bits. The goal of decoy-state method is to verify
such bounds faithfully and efficiently.
So far a number of experiments on decoy-state QKD have been done[16, 17, 18], in optical
fiber or in free space, in polarization space or with phase-coding. However, the existing
theory of decoy-state method assumes the exact control of pulse intensities. A new problem
arose in practice is how to carry out the decoy-state method efficiently given the inexact
control of pulse intensity. As we have shown[19], actually, one can verify the single-photon
counts rather efficiently with simple tomography even though the intensity fluctuations of
each light pulses are large. However, there Alice needs additional operation of tomography.
Also, to guarantee the randomness of intensity fluctuation, Alice needs to do something
more, e.g., take a feedback control of attenuation. Here we present a simpler protocol for
decoy-state method QKD. This protocol assumes a set-up identical with that of the existing
experiment, but one needs the information of intensity upper-bound of all pulses.
We consider the 3-intensity decoy-state method[2] where Alice is supposed to choose an
intensity out of {0, µ, µ′} randomly for each pulses. But in a real set-up, she cannot control
the intensity exactly for each pulse as she wants to. As we have shown already[19], a bit
inexact control in vacuum doesn’t matter. Therefore here we shall only consider the effects
of inexact control of µ, µ′.
For clarity, lets first consider an ideal protocol with exact intensity control, as shown
in Fig. 1:a). At any time t, if Alice wants to send a pulse of intensity µ or µ′, she first
produces a father pulse of intensity Ω. After that she attenuates by the pulse A(t) = µ/Ω
or A(t) = µ′/Ω randomly and a pulse of intensity µ or µ′ is produced randomly and sent
out to Bob. In this ideal protocol, Both Ω and A(t) are controlled exactly.
In practice, we use a similar protocol as shown in Fig. 1:b). Alice wants to produce an
intensity Ω for the father pulse. She then takes the same random attenuations as that in the
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FIG. 1: a) The ideal protocol that Alice can produce constant intensity Ω for the father pulse
therefore intensity µ, µ′ are controlled exactly. b) The true protocol used in practice. At each time,
Alice wants to produce intensity Ω for the father pulse, however, she actually produces {Ωt} at
each time t. Consequently, the intensities of output pulses are {µi}, {µ
′
i}. We assume that Alice
can control the attenuator A(t) exactly in a real protocol. After a father pulse is produced, Alice
randomly choose the attenuation factor by A(t) = µ/Ω or A(t) = µ′/Ω. Here the subscript t is
from 1 to N +N ′, subscript i for {µi} is from 1 to N , subscript i for {µ
′
i} is from 1 to N
′.
ideal protocol. Here we assume that Alice can control the attenuation factors of A(t) exactly
(either µ/Ω or µ′/Ω) but she can not control Ω exactly. (There are many ways to control
the attenuator A(t) exactly. For example, we can use unbalanced beam-splitters.) In each
time, she has actually produced intensities of {Ωt} for the father pulses. (Here t is a discrete
number. )Although we can never control the intensity exactly, by our currently existing
technology, we can definitely control the intensity in a small range, say, e.g., controlling the
fluctuation between ±20% of Ω. That is to say, Alice knows the upper-bound of {Ωt}. We
denote such an upper bound value as ΩM .
Given this upper-bound value ΩM , the set-up in Fig. 1:b) is equivalent to a virtual set-up
as shown in Fig. 2:a). In the virtual protocol shown in Fig. 2:a), every time a father pulse
of constant intensity ΩM is first produced and then the pulse is attenuated randomly, with
attenuation factors of A′(t) = Ωt
ΩM
. Alice cannot control this A′(t). After this attenuation,
a pulse of intensity Ωt is produced. Note that A
′(t) is independent of µ, µ′, since we can
imagine that Alice decides to use µ or µ′ after the attenuation A′(t). Since all attenuators
are inside Alice’s Lab., it makes no difference if Alice exchange the order of attenuators A(t)












μ μ 'i ior
μ' μor ~~
FIG. 2: Equivalent virtual protocols. Our real protocol in Fig. 1:b) is equivalent to a virtual
protocol as shown in part a) of this figure. Here Alice first produces a constant intensity ΩM for
each father pulses and then attenuates each of them by attenuator A′(t). After A′(t), the pulse
intensity is Ωt. It makes no difference to the output light if we exchange the order of A(t) and
A′(t), therefore a) is equivalent to b). In part b), we can regard the dashed square as our source
and A′(t) as part of the channel, if Alice let Eve controls A′(t). In this way, it is equivalent to a
decoy-state protocol where Alice has used exact intensities of {0, µ˜, µ˜′}.
and then arrange the attenuation A′(t) which is independent of Alice’s decision of using µ
or µ′. This is just the virtual protocol in Fig. 2:b). In Fig. 2:b), after the pulse passes A(t)







is to say, during the virtual stage between A(t) and A′(t), the light intensities of each pulses
are either exactly µ˜ or exactly µ˜′. But after a pulse passes through A′(t), the intensity is
changed to inexact values of µi or µ
′
i. For the security proof of the real set-up in Fig. 1:b),
we show the following lemma first.
Lemma: The set-up in Fig. 2:b) is unconditionally secure if Alice regards it as a
3-intensity decoy-state protocol with each light intensities being randomly chosen from
{0, µ˜, µ˜′}.
Proof: First we suppose Eve controls A′(t). The dashed square can be regarded as an exact
source for a decoy-state protocol using intensities 0, µ˜, µ˜′. As it has been known already,
decoy-state method with exact intensity control is secure given whatever channel. Here what
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Eve can do is first using A′(t) for attenuation and then do whatever. This is a only type of
specific channel therefore cannot be used to cheat Alice and Bob. In the set-up of Fig. 2:b),
actually the attenuator A′(t) is not controlled by Eve, definitely the set-up is secure because
Eve cannot attack the protocol better with her power being reduced. In Eve’s eyes, A′(t)
could have been controlled by Alice since it makes no difference to Eve on whether Alice
knows the explicit values of A′(t).
Given this lemma, we immediately have the theorem: The set-up shown in Fig. 1:b)
is also unconditionally secure if Alice knows that values of {Ωt} are upper-bounded by ΩM
and she then does the calculation of fraction of single-photon counts as if she had used a
3-intensity decoy-state protocol with exact intensities of {0, µ˜, µ˜′}. The proof is simply that
the final light pulses produced in Fig. 1:b) and final light pulses produced in Fig. 2:b) are
identical.
Having this theorem, we now evaluate the efficiency of our protocol. Lets restate our
protocol before evaluation. Alice wants to use intensities of 0, µ = 0.2, µ′ = 0.6. Every time
she sends out nothing to Bob if she chooses to sends out vacuum, otherwise she first produces
a father pulse and she tries to control the intensities of the father pulse to be constant, say
Ω. She then uses exact attenuation of either 0.2/Ω or 0.6/Ω. Although she tries to produce
intensity µ or µ′ precisely, there are intensity fluctuations. She knows that ever time the
intensity of the father pulse is at most λΩ (λ ≥ 1). According to our theorem, she needs to
calculate the fraction of single-photon counts as if she had just done a decoy-state protocol
with intensities of 0, µ˜ = λµ, µ˜′ = λµ′.
We consider the normal case where there is no Eve. and a linear channel that has a
transmittance η. Normally, Alice and Bob can find the values of ηµ, ηµ′ for the counting
rates of pulses of supposed intensities of µ, µ′, respectively, if there is no dark count. But in
calculating the fraction of single-photon counts, Alice has to assume µ˜, µ˜′ as intensities she
has used in the protocol. Suppose there are N,N ′ pulses for the supposed intensities µ, µ′
(N ′ > N), respectively. We have the following joint equations[2]:
e−λµs0 + λµe
















Here c = 1− e−λµ − λµe−λµ, S and S ′ are the observed counting rates of pulses of supposed
intensity µ, µ′, respectively. Parameters of sx are counting rates for states |x〉〈x| from µ
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FIG. 3: Comparison of the verified fraction of single photon counting rates between our protocol
and an ideal protocol with exact intensity control. Horizontal axis is for the λ value and vertical
axis is for the calculated ratio of R = ∆˜
′
∆′
pulses (x = 0, 1), sc is the counting rates of state ρc (state of those multi-photon pulses)
from µ pulses. Parameters s′x are counting rates of the same state as defined for sx, but
they are for those states from µ′ pulses only. The values of s0, s
′
0 can be deduced from the
counting rate of those vacuum pulses. Asymptotically, sx = s
′
x. Given finite number of
pulses, sx and s
′
x can be a bit different. We have











Putting this into eqs.(1) we have
e−λµs0 + λµe













(1− rc)sc ≤ S
′.
(3)
Solving the above equations numerically we can obtain the value of s1. If Alice controls
the light intensity exactly, then λ = 1 in eqs.(3). In a real protocol, Alice cannot control
the light intensity exactly therefore λ > 1. In the calculation, we set s0 = s
′
0 = 0, η = 10
−4,
µ = 0.2, µ′ = 0.6, S = ηµ, S ′ = ηµ′ and N = 109 We have calculated the values given
different λ. And we then compare the fraction of single-photon counts (∆˜′) of µ′ pulses from

















where s1(λ), s1 are the solution of single-photon counting rates with parameter λ > 1, λ = 1
in eqs.(3). We have taken a few different λ values in the calculation. Results are shown in
Fig. 3.
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